

Labour resources under conditions of military danger as a key factor in increasing industrial potential

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Abstract. The article examines the problem of mobilising the industrial potential of Russia in terms of the growing military danger during SMO under decrease in the demographic and labour potential of the Russian Federation. The authors emphasize the effective involvement of labour resources is a key element for development of the industrial potential. Those are necessary to counter the increasing escalation of the military conflict and the desire of Western countries for military and political defeat of Russia. However, the reduction of labour potential and the aging of the population can cause serious socio-economic and political problems. A liberal approach to migration poses long-term threats to the State. Unregulated migration processes will inevitably cause an increase in unemployment, a decrease in the share Russian nation itself, loss of national identity, social tension, and cultural, ethnic, and religious conflicts. It requires a thorough systematised approach and effective monitoring of demographic trends. The state should find a balance between attracting labour from outside and increasing its own labour resources. It also should provide the rational use of existing labour resources.

Keywords: labour resources, industrial potential, migration, population, highly qualified personnel, mobilization economy, scientific potential, military danger, escalation of armed conflict, migration policy

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Introduction

Increasing industrial production in terms of the urgency to mobilise Russia's industrial potential according to the current military-political situation of further escalation of the armed conflict in Ukraine is possible only with the effective involvement of labour resources in production. Russian historical experience shows the ability of human resources to compensate a shortage in the financial and technical spheres even in a critical situation. Indeed, the absence of qualified specialists and employees cannot be compensated in a short time. A crisis does not allow State to compensate the shortage of labour resources in the industrial sector rapidly through production automation. Therefore, it requires time and significant financial flows. The production automation is complicated due to economic sanctions against our country. It is not impossible to purchase the necessary machinery abroad. Therefore, it takes a lot of time and highly qualified specialists to incorporate domestic high-tech facilities.

Our previous studies concern with the requirement for a qualitative increase in Russian industrial potential and relevance of expanding and upgrading of production capacities [1-2]. This study also considers the issues of labour resources. Those correlate with the demography and population of Russia. However, the development of industrial potential and demography are closely related. The population is one of the main factors determining the size and quality of labour resources. It also provides demand for goods, services, and

resources for production. Moreover, the development of industrial potential affects the regional economy, new jobs, unemployment reduction, and improvement of living conditions. In turn, the increase in the number of employees stimulates investment and development of regional industrial sectors.

Hence, the effective use of human potential allowed the USSR to achieve the large-scale strategic goals. Previously, we analysed the USSR achievements in details [1-2]. However, it is impossible to transfer previous historical experience to modern realities. Digitalisation and scientific and technological progress significantly changed the economic situation and production cycles. Nevertheless, the labour force remains a key factor in production. Consequently, the analysis of labour resources structure and efficiency, increasing of Russia industrial potential to counter the measures taken by the countries of the Western anti-Russian coalition are of the great importance.

Main part

1. Labour resources of the Russian Federation

Untrained and unskilled labour is the most widespread and mobile resource. This kind of work does not involve long and complex qualification training. Thus, people involved in it can be redirected to various industrial sites without loss of productivity. Indeed, it is sufficient to provide the necessary instruction and minimal professional training of the personnel. Those costs associated with this kind of rotation should be covered by the State. In the conditions of a mobilisation economy, the advantages of unskilled labour become especially valuable; they allow ones to concentrate production forces on the implementation of priority goals in a short time.

The other most significant part of the labour force for the country's economy is undoubtedly the intellectual and scientific and technical elite. It plays a key role in the industrial potential of any state, ensures the development and competitiveness of national industries, and stimulates economic growth and innovative development of the country. Nowadays, under the Western sanctions, the importance of increasing the efficiency of highly qualified labour resources is particularly acute for the Russian Federation [2].

The skilled labour is the basis of the technical, technological, and economic development of society. According to A. Smith, the level of wages in a country is an indicator of its economic development. This is the prerogative of skilled labour (productive and high-qualitative enough) to provide significant effectiveness for social progress [3, p. 81].

Although, it is possible to identify some significant issues of using intellectual resources limiting the development of the Russian economy. In particular, there is a trend of outflow of highly qualified specialists abroad, especially managers and engineering specialists.

Rosstat provides information on specialists emigrated from Russia categorizing them according to their specialism profiles and level of training (Tables 1, 2).

Table 1 – The number of Russian citizens moved abroad, by occupations and positions, persons

Years	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022
The total number of citizens, persons	70,236	57,138	57,638	45,463	53,149	55,597
including:						
managers	13,068	14,416	15,715	11,811	15,389	16,165
specialists	20,069	20,835	19,832	16,867	18,985	19,205
of these:						
in the field of engineering and technology	14,799	16,229	14,584	13,323	14,389	14,798
engaged in the maintenance and repair of computer equipment	96	20	30	42	46	58
in the field of healthcare	113	27	52	43	20	55
in the field of culture and art	683	282	172	44	50	66
educational, teaching staff	238	20	18	5	24	26

Years	2010	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022
other	4,140	4,257	4,976	3,410	4,456	4,202
workforce	23,606	19,151	19,860	15,879	17,756	18,901

Source: Labour and employment in Russia, 2023

Table 2 – The number of Russians mover to work abroad, by level of education, persons

Years	Persons					as percentage of total				
	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022	2015	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total, persons	57,138	57,638	45,463	53,149	55,597	100	100	100	100	100
of these have an education:										
higher	27,775	32,618	25,850	30,364	32,956	48.6	56.6	56.9	57.1	59.3
vocational secondary education	21,627	19,211	15,274	17,737	18,352	37.9	33.3	33.6	33.4	33
secondary general education	6,583	5,704	4,121	4,812	4,166	11.5	9.9	9.1	9.1	7.5
do not have secondary general education	1,153	105	218	236	123	2	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.2

Source: Labour and employment in Russia, 2023

According to the analysis, the emigrated labour force has been decreasing between 2010 and 2020. However, since 2020, there is a trend of brain drain abroad and the percentage of emigrants with higher education has been growing.

Indeed, in this economic and political situation this trend complicates the mobilisation of resources, slows down economic growth, and becomes a serious challenge for the State.

It is not ready to actively restore the rapidly lost scientific and technical potential. This is evidenced by the low investments into R&D and scientific sphere (Table 3).

Table 3 – Financing of science from the federal budget, mln RUB

Years	Science costs from the federal budget, mln RUB	of these, the cost of basic research, mln RUB	of these, the cost of for applied scientific research, mln RUB	as a percentage of federal budget costs, %	as a percentage of GDP, %
2000	17,396.40	8,219.30	9,177.10	1.69	0.24
2005	76,909.30	32,025.10	44,884.20	2.19	0.36
2010	237,644.00	82,172.00	155,472.00	2.35	0.51
2011	313,899.30	91,684.50	222,214.80	2.87	0.52
2012	355,921.10	86,623.20	269,297.90	2.76	0.52
2013	425,301.70	112,230.90	313,070.80	3.19	0.58
2014	437,273.30	121,599.50	315,673.80	2.95	0.55
2015	439,392.80	120,203.80	319,188.90	2.81	0.53
2016	402,722.30	105,247.60	297,474.70	2.45	0.47
2017	377,882.20	116,977.60	260,904.60	2.30	0.41

Years	Science costs from the federal budget, mln RUB	of these, the cost of basic research, mln RUB	of these, the cost of for applied scientific research, mln RUB	as a percentage of federal budget costs, %	as a percentage of GDP, %
2018	420,472.30	149,550.00	270,922.30	2.52	0.40
2019	489,158.4	192,495.00	296,663.10	2.69	0.44
2020	549,602.20	203,246.80	346,355.40	2.41	0.51
2021	626,574.30	225,152.70	401,421.60	2.53	0.48
2022	631,701.60	247,286.90	384,414.80	2.51	0.41

Source: Rosstat. *Science, Innovation and Technology. Financing of science from the Federal Budget (since 2000)*

Moreover, this kind of labour resources have a low mobility. Well trained specialists are not ready to move to other country regions to find a job. Therefore, some regions have a shortage of specialists, and vice versa. It also reduces the efficiency of using their own potential and industrial potential of the State.

However, there is another significant category. It includes a wide range of professions and specialties involved in other economic sectors. For instance, specialists employed in educational institutions, medical workers, service sector employees, and other specialists providing the high-quality functioning of society. They are an integral part of the social sphere and labour resources; their quality directly affects the level of industrial potential of the State.

According to Rosstat, the employment structure in Russia is as follows (Table 4).

Table 4 – The average annual number of people employed in Russia by type of economic activity, in % of the total

Years	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total, %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
of these, by type of economic activity:						
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing, and fish farming	7.1	6.9	6.7	6.5	6.3	6.3
Mining	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7
Manufacturing industries	14.2	14.1	14.0	14.0	14.1	14.0
Provision of electric energy, gas and steam; air conditioning	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2
Water supply; sanitation, waste collection and disposal, pollution elimination	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Construction	8.8	8.9	9.0	8.9	9.2	9.2
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	19.0	19.1	19.0	18.8	18.7	18.6
Transportation and storage	7.3	7.5	7.6	7.8	8.0	8.1
Activities of hotels and food service companies	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
Information and communication activities	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.3
Financial and insurance activities	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8

Years	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Real estate activities	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6
Professional, scientific and technical activities	4.1	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.9	3.9
Administrative activities and related additional services	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.9
Public administration and military security; social security	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.1	5.0
Education	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.5	7.4
Health and social services	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.3	6.2
Culture, sports, leisure, and entertainment	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Other services	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.4

Source: Rosstat. The average annual number of people employed in Russia (by enlarged types of economic activity)

Hence, Russian resource structure is well-organised and does not fluctuate much over the past six years. It indicates the stability of the economic situation and the well-organised structure of economy before the SMO.

However, the conditions of peaceful time and the SMO period are different ones. Part of consisting the country's labour potential is forcibly withdrawn from the economy to be included in the active army service; some workers voluntarily leave their work to protect the motherland. It causes serious difficulties in replacing outgoing labour resources, training them. It also raises issues of demography and migration as factors of replacing declining labour resources and providing them to ensure the necessary labour and industrial potential. However, these decisions threaten to the Russians and require special research.

2. Demography as a factor in the formation of labour resources for the economy and the military-industrial complex

The issue of population size, especially the national one, is extremely relevant for our country. Despite Russia is the largest country in the world, its population is not very large, especially, in terms of working-age population.

The demographic situation in Russia can be characterized by the following trends:

- birth inclination;
- increased mortality rate;
- aging of a nation;
- decrease in percentage of working age population;
- reduction of the ethnic Russians;
- migration.

In the Demographic Almanac of Russia for 2023, Rosstat presented the population natural growth, 1990-2022 (Table 5).

Table 5 – Births, deaths, and natural population growth, persons

Years	Total, persons			
	born	dead	of these, those who died under the age of 1 year	natural growth
1960	2,782,353	886,090	102,040	1,896,263
1965	1,990,520	958,789	53,798	1,031,731
1970	1,903,713	1,131,183	43,511	772,530

Years	Total, persons			
	born	dead	of these, those who died under the age of 1 year	natural growth
1975	2,106,147	1,309,710	49,806	796,437
1980	2,202,779	1,525,755	48,500	677,024
1985	2,375,147	1,625,266	49,381	749,881
1990	1,988,858	1,655,993	35,088	332,865
1995	1,363,806	2,203,811	24,840	-840,005
2000	1,266,800	2,225,332	19,286	-958,532
2001	1,311,604	2,254,856	19,104	-943,252
2002	1,396,967	2,332,272	18,407	-935,305
2003	1,477,301	2,365,826	18,142	-888,525
2004	1,502,477	2,295,402	17,339	-792,925
2005	1,457,376	2,303,935	16,073	-846,559
2006	1,479,637	2,166,703	15,079	-687,066
2007	1,610,122	2,080,445	14,858	-470,323
2008	1,713,947	2,075,954	14,436	-362,007
2009	1,761,687	2,010,543	14,271	-248,856
2010	1,788,948	2,028,516	13,405	-239,568
2011	1,796,629	1,925,720	13,168	-129,091
2012	1,902,084	1,906,335	16,306	-4,251
2013	1,895,822	1,871,809	15,477	24,013
2014	1,942,683	1,912,347	14,322	30,336
2015	1,940,579	1,908,541	12,664	32,038
2016	1,888,729	1,891,015	11,428	-2,286
2017	1,690,307	1,826,125	9,577	-135,818
2018	1,604,344	1,828,910	8,244	-224,566
2019	1,481,074	1,798,307	7,328	-317,233
2020	1,436,514	2,138,586	6,489	-702,072
2021	1,398,253	2,441,594	6,516	-1,043,341
2022	1,304,087	1,898,644	5,876	-594,557

Source: Demographic Almanac of Russia, 2023

The natural population decline in 2020 reached to 702 thousand people, and in 2021 reached 1.04 mln people. It was the maximum in the history of the modern Russia. Mortality in 2021 increased by 14.2% and reached 2.44 mln people. The main reason was the COVID-19 pandemic. The birth rate in 2021 decreased by 2.7% and reached to 1.4 mln people – at least since 2002.

In 2022, 1,304,087 people were born in Russia, which is 6.7% less than in 2021. Last year 1,898,644 people died, which is 22.2% less than in 2021.

According to the table, mortality has significantly decreased in 2022. However, it still exceeds the birth rate. Therefore, we can note a demographic crisis and tendency to the national ageing.

The sharp decline in the birth rate at the end of the 20th century causes the decrease of number of children in Russia. It resulted in decreasing of the population over working age. The retirees in Russia decreased after the pension reform. The working age limit was increased to 5 years. The replacement rate in

2023 is 18.1%. Before the reform began in 2018, there were 553 retirees per 1,000 workforce.

Moreover, the issue of the increase in the economic burden on the working-age population due to the rapid growth in the share of retirees is of the particular concern (Table 6).

Table 6 – Share of retirees in the total population, %

Years	Total, persons, %	including at the age of, %		
		60-64	65-69	70 and older
2008	100.00	2.25	1.14	0.41
2009	100.00	2.57	0.94	0.43
2010	100.00	2.95	0.74	0.37
2011	100.00	3.30	0.76	0.35
2012	100.00	3.38	0.82	0.27
2013	100.00	3.44	0.91	0.23
2014	100.00	3.60	0.95	0.18
2015	100.00	3.79	1.05	0.16
2016	100.00	3.90	1.10	0.16
2017	100.00	3.89	1.23	0.34
2018	100.00	4.12	1.33	0.40
2019	100.00	4.30	1.48	0.45
2020	100.00	4.63	1.50	0.43
2021	100.00	4.96	1.47	0.41

Source: *Labour force, employment and unemployment in Russia (based on the results of labour force sample surveys), 2022*

The increasing of social costs to support the infrastructure serving the elderly population may require a sharp increase in the tax burden on the economy or cause the collapse of the pension system. It will provide acute socio-economic and political challenges [4, p. 114].

Indeed, population ageing will cause a decrease in the birth rate, an increase in mortality and morbidity of the population, negative impact on the national health care system, etc.

The general health of working-age population is deteriorating. Accordingly, professional and qualification characteristics are becoming outdated, mobility and susceptibility to change are decreasing, etc. Figure 1 shows the average age of the employed workforce according to Rosstat¹.




Figure 1. Average age of employees, years

Source: *Labour force, employment and unemployment in Russia (based on the results of labour force sample surveys), 2022*

¹ *Labour force, employment and unemployment in Russia (based on the results of labour force sample surveys), 2022*

The decline in the number, share, and ageing of this part of the population significantly reduces labour potential both quantitatively and qualitatively. Indeed, it makes the implementation of an optimistic scenario of economic growth very problematic.

Moreover, the reduction of demographic and labour potential decrease the State mobilisation potential.

A decrease in the number of young men of conscriptional age, fit for health reasons to serve in law enforcement agencies, is a threat to the country's defence capability. It definitely complicates the protection of country borders and internal stability [4, p. 114].

3. Issues of labour resources migration replacement in the Russian Federation

The shortage of human resources, the forced reduction in the number of law enforcement agencies could contribute to the activation of terrorist groups, territorial claims against Russia, an increase in the flow of illegal migrants and drug trafficking. All of these could jeopardise the very existence of the country.

Since 2016, there has been a steady decline in natural population growth. Data for 1990-2022 are presented in Table 7.

Table 7 – Components of the change in the total population, thousand persons

Years	Population as of January 1	Changes over the year			Population as of December 31	Total annual growth, %
		total increase	natural growth	migration growth		
1990	147,665.10	608.6	333.6	275	148,273.70	0.41
1995	148,459.90	-168.3	-822	653.7	148,291.60	-0.11
1996	148,291.60	-263	-776.5	513.5	148,028.60	-0.18
1997	148,028.60	-226.5	-740.6	514.1	147,802.10	-0.15
1998	147,802.10	-262.7	-691.5	428.8	147,539.40	-0.18
1999	147,539.40	-649.3	-918.8	269.5	146,890.10	-0.44
2000	146,890.10	-586.5	-949.1	362.6	146,303.60	-0.4
2001	146,303.60	-654.3	-932.8	278.5	145,649.30	-0.45
2002	145,649.30	-685.7	-916.5	230.8	144,963.60	-0.47
2003	144,963.60	-630	-888.5	258.5	144,333.60	-0.43
2004	144,333.60	-532.6	-793	260.4	143,801.00	-0.37
2005	143,801.00	-564.4	-846.5	282.1	143,236.60	-0.39
2006	143,236.60	-373.9	-687.1	313.2	142,862.70	-0.26
2007	142,862.70	-115.2	-470.3	355.1	142,747.50	-0.08
2008	142,747.50	-10.3	-362	351.7	142,737.20	0.01
2009	142,737.20	96.3	-248.9	345.2	142,833.50	0.07
2010	142,833.50	31.9	-239.6	271.5	142,865.40	0.02
2011	142,865.40	305.5	-129.1	434.6	143,171.00	0.21
2012	143,171.00	414.9	-4.3	419.2	143,585.90	0.29
2013	143,585.90	439.4	24	415.4	144,025.30	0.31
2014	144,025.30	146,744.00	1.89
2015	146,744.00	438.3	32	406.3	147,182.30	0.3
2016	147,182.30	397.7	-2.3	400	147,580.00	0.27
2017	147,580.00	217.1	-135.8	352.9	147,797.10	0.15
2018	147,797.10	43.6	-224.6	268.2	147,840.70	0.03
2019	147,840.70	118.6	-317.2	435.8	147,959.30	0.08

Years	Population as of January 1	Changes over the year			Population as of December 31	Total annual growth, %
		total increase	natural growth	migration growth		
2020	147,959.30	-503.6	-702.1	198.5	147,455.70	-0.34
2021	147,455.70	-475.6	-1,043.30	567.7	146,980.10	-0.32
2022	146,980.10	-532.7	-594.6	61.9	146,447.40	-0.36

Source: Demographic Almanac of Russia, 2023

According to the analysis, negative natural growth is partially compensated by positive migration growth. Many countries including Russia use the labour resources inflow as a tool for quickly and effectively avoiding of their own resources deficit. However, it related to many negative consequences.

Currently, the majority of labour immigrants in Russia are from Tajikistan, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (Table 8).

Table 8 – Migration of the population of the Russian Federation from the CIS countries, 2022, persons

	Migrants from the CIS countries	the Russian Federation
By countries	Total	661,986
	Azerbaijan	31,773
	Armenia	59,533
	Belarus	18,824
	Kazakhstan	64,382
	Kyrgyzstan	62,360
	Republic of Moldova	23,540
	Tadjikistan	186,560
	Turkmenistan	12,133
	Uzbekistan	54,035
	Ukraine	148,846

Source: Rosstat. The number of migrants, the Russian Federation, 2022²

The most of migrants arriving in the Russian Federation are untrained or low-skilled workers. Table 9 shows the migrants by the level of education.

Table 9 – Distribution of migrants aged 14 years and older by level of education and countries of exit/admission in the Russian Federation in 2022, persons

	Group of migrants	International migration
	The number of migrants to Russia aged 14 years and older:	652,847
including having an education:	higher professional education (higher education)	65,188
	having an academic degree	
	Doctors of Sciences	171
	Candidate of Sciences	512
	incomplete higher professional education (incomplete higher education)	42,564
	secondary vocational (secondary specialized)	131,493
	initial professional education	22,651
	secondary general education	224,481
	basic general (secondary general incomplete)	46,950

² Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). The number of migrants, the Russian Federation, 2022 (Statistical Bulletin). URL: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/media-bank/Bul-migr_2022.xlsx. (Accessed 27.02.2024)

Group of migrants		International migration
	primary general (primary) and non-educated	11,325
	no information on the level of education	108,195

Source: Rosstat. *The number of migrants, the Russian Federation, 2022*³

Hence, it decreases the scientific, technical, and the industrial potential of the State, and suggests the necessity of reforming the methods of state regulation in the migration sphere.

In addition, this trend increases the social costs. Moreover, decrease of natural change, the emigration of the Russian population and immigration of foreign ones decline the share of Russian citizens in the Russian Federation. It could threaten national identity, resulting in territorial and legislative difficulties, a decline in defence capabilities and divisions based on different values, views and development goals. This situation will negatively affect the community solidarity and reduce the industrial potential of the State.

Historically, the peoples living on the territory of these states, before their declaration of independence after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, were culturally connected with Russia, and were also native speakers of Russian (as a second language). However, the younger generation do not speak Russian; and cultural differences are also growing.

Moreover, these ethnic groups do not have historically established and legally fixed lands on the territory of the Russian Federation. Therefore, these migrants should be integrated into the Russian community. Over time, some of them will be naturally assimilated as a result of mixed marriages. Otherwise, an increase in the concentration of such migrants could hypothetically threaten the growth of fellow countrymen's association up to the formation of ethnic enclaves. The language barrier and adaptation difficulties promote the isolation of migrants; their communities preserve national traditions, and their qualitative integration does not take place. In could cause the new demographic challenges.

For instance, there is an experience of France. Due to the Schengen Agreement, the possibilities of controlling immigrants in the single European space have become significantly weakened. Additionally, the majority of immigrants, mainly from African and Asian countries, have not been able to integrate into the host society [5, p. 95]. The refusal to integrate causes the formation of ghettos, the emergence of deprived areas with the higher rate of crime and unemployment. Thereby, inconsiderate migration policy resulted in significant negative consequences.

4. Possible solutions to the challenges on Russians labour resources in order to preserve the country's labour potential

Indeed, the replacement of labour potential in terms of negative demographic situation and SMO is a serious social and national threat to Russia. In this regard, it would be reasonable to take an organized and limited approach to attracting labour migrants to the country; for instance, on a temporary (contractual) rather than on a permanent basis, without the possibility for migrants to permanently reside in Russia or create ethnically homogeneous families. It would make it possible to regulate the inflow and outflow of labour in the labor market, depending on changing needs, without creating delayed risks for Russian society. Moreover, it could provide strengthening of cultural and economic relations with the labour migrants' donor countries. These challenges and ways to overcome them should be carefully studied by specialists; the results should be considered when developing new measures in the migration sphere.

Another method of quickly and effectively addressing the issue of labour resources may be the repatriation⁴ and resettlement of compatriots.

It could allow the State to avoid the additional regulation in sphere of immigrants' cultural differences, language barrier, etc. Moreover, skilled employees having the work experience in other developed countries

³ Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). *The number of migrants, the Russian Federation, 2022 (Statistical Bulletin)*. URL: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/media-bank/Bul-migr_2022.xlsx. (Accessed 27.02.2024).

⁴ *This paper considers repatriation as a process of voluntary, organized return of Russian compatriots to Russia (those, who forced to leave Russia on the reasons of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, the collapse of the USSR, the restoration of repatriates' citizenship rights, etc.).*

could become a source of specific skills and competencies of interest to our state and a resource for the development of domestic science and industry.

In terms of repatriation, we can consider the experience of Israel as an example of an effective migration policy. Israel has existed since 1948. By that time, the country's population was about 1.5 million people. However, by 1960 it had grown to 2.1 million. Sharp population increase occurred partly due to the political conflicts in other countries. It provided the immigration of the Jewish.

However, the key factor in effective repatriation was the provision of attractive conditions and prospects for ethnic representatives. First of all, the Law on Return guarantees every Jewish person the right to repatriation to Israel. The Citizenship Act ensures citizenship to all who have arrived in the country under the Law of Return. The Government of Israel provides various benefits: education, accommodation, finance, etc. The state provides payments to the absorption basket for six months, free admission to language courses (ulpan). During the first three years, there is an opportunity to study at the university free of charge. There are also various programs available before repatriation to the country: they include training and tourist trips. Many repatriates firstly participate in the programmes, and only then decide whether to migrate or not. Starting from the moment of arrival, the further integration process of the repatriate is coordinated by a special consultant, which is of great importance for the integration of repatriates both in the Israeli State system and in local society.

Indeed, the experience in attracting competent specialists could be useful for Russia. However, it is necessary not only to attract external labour resources but also reform the methodology for regulating their quality.

One of the measures implemented could be the formation of an automated data bank containing all the necessary information on emigrated specialists: gender, age, education, working experience, information on the recipient state, position held by the emigrant in the company of this state, etc. Meanwhile, bank system could help to obtain the statistics on valuable emigrating specialists in the context of a massive staff drain and staff training general decrease. The information data could be used by domestic companies experiencing a shortage of highly qualified personnel to attract compatriots [6, p. 82].

Additionally, Russia could stimulate educational immigration. To provide it, the State should develop programs attracting foreign students, and ensure them further prospects for realizing scientific potential in the Russian Federation. It could include preferential professional training necessary for the development of Russia's industrial potential, grants, internships in large companies, scholarships, etc. We believe, it allows the State to balance the quality of migration growth. However, when implementing such a policy, it is necessary to focus on retaining specialists in the country after their training and realising their potential. It could be possible with the involvement of industrial companies in the process of teaching students, their internships in these companies, and the development of online vocational education .

The other important aspect in addressing the issue of replenishing Russia with qualified labour resources is the state ability to «return» students who left for training in other countries [7, p. 396]. In conditions of scientific capacity shortage, the State also requires a revision of social support policies for potential immigrants. The recommendation includes strengthening of financial assistance, providing a favourable socio-economic situation, encouraging students studied abroad to return to their homeland. All above are important factors in attracting migrants.

Another source of increasing the labour force and labour potential of Russia is the repatriation of citizens who have Russian roots and relatives and wish to unite with their ethnic homeland. Moreover, the procedures for obtaining the necessary work-related documents, obtaining and restoring citizenship should be simplified for the repatriates. Also, there should be provided an assistance in creating all the necessary conditions for their successful adaptation and further productive activity.

Non-Russian immigrants expressing intentions to assimilate in Russia and create mixed inter-ethnic families should be provided with assistance in overcoming cultural and language barriers, creating conditions for a comfortable living, and demonstrating of their own labour potential. Simultaneously, the State should regulate the labour market as follows: low-skilled labour force should become a qualitative source of labour

resources not a cause of growing unemployment.

Conclusion

Therefore, to enforce demographic challenges in the current economic and political situation we require fundamentally new concepts. The change of negative demographic trends to positive ones is possible only in case of reforms corresponding to the trends of modern society development.

A liberal approach to migration poses long-term threats to the State. Unregulated migration processes will inevitably cause an increase in unemployment, a decrease in the share Russian nation itself, loss of national identity, social tension, and cultural, ethnic, and religious conflicts. It requires a thorough systematised approach and effective monitoring of demographic trends. The state should find a balance between attracting labour from outside and increasing its own labour resources. It also should provide the rational use of existing labour resources.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTION

Yuriy V. Bekrenev – conceptualization, project administration, writing – original draft.

Alexandra S. Vakina – data curation

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