Theoretical economics Theoretical economics Теоретическая экономика 2221-3260 88289 10.52957/2221-3260-2024-7-70-79 НОВАЯ ИНДУСТРИАЛИЗАЦИЯ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ NEW INDUSTRIALIZATION: THEORETICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECT НОВАЯ ИНДУСТРИАЛИЗАЦИЯ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЙ АСПЕКТ Market incentives for the introduction of environmentally friendly products in conditions of asymmetry between companies Рыночные стимулы внедрения экологически чистых продуктов в условиях асимметрии между компаниями https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4952-1512 Елкина Ольга Сергеевна Elkina Olga Sergeevna elkina-os@ranepa.ru

доктор экономических наук;

doctor of economic sciences;

 Северо-Западный институт управления РАНХиГС St Petersburg Россия North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration St Petersburg Russian Federation 06 09 2024 06 09 2024 7 70 79 09 07 2024 10 07 2024 https://chemintech.ru/en/nauka/article/88289/view

Нестабильная рыночная экономика, проблемы экологии, формирующиеся под воздействием углеродного развития и необходимость поиска экологических инноваций становятся вызовом для внедрения экологически чистых продуктов или ориентации на достижение долгосрочных экологических целей. Цель статьи – выявить рыночные стимулы внедрения экологических чистых продуктов на основе ассиметричной дуополии и теории дилеммы узника (теории игр), действующего в условиях ограниченного доступа к информации, и исходя из предположения о невмешательстве государства в экологические процессы. В исследовании были получены следующие результаты. Было определено, как динамика рынка и конкуренция влияют на предложение экологически чистых и экологически грязных продуктов, с учетом затрат на технологию, сформированности спроса, конкурентных преимуществ и доступа к информации. Результаты демонстрируют, что ориентация на экологически чистые продукты происходит только при условии низких затрат на эти инновации и уже сформированного спроса. Информированность о действиях конкурентов делает рынок экологически чистых продуктов более прогнозируемым, в большей степени ориентируемым на экологичность продукта. Разнообразие экологически чистых продуктов формируется только при одном условии – асимметрии затрат. Формирование дифференции продуктов является важным условием, поскольку потребители на рынке обладают разным уровнем дохода. В статье сформированы рекомендации для реализации государственной политики, направленной на поддержку сокращения издержек компаний на экологические инновации и на обеспечение дифференциации продуктов, обеспечивающей интересы всех категорий потребителей. Ограничения исследования: в статье не изучалась функция спроса и его эластичность, а также не изучены стратегии, связанные с взаимодействием цены и количества продукта.

An unstable market economy, environmental problems arising under the influence of carbon development and the need to search for environmental innovations are becoming a challenge for the introduction of environmentally friendly products or orientation towards achieving long-term environmental goals. The purpose of the article is to identify market incentives for the introduction of environmentally friendly products based on an asymmetric duopoly and the theory of the prisoner’s dilemma (game theory), operating in conditions of limited access to information, and based on the assumption of non–interference of the state in environmental processes. The following results were obtained in the study. It was determined how market dynamics and competition affect the supply of environmentally friendly and environmentally dirty products, taking into account the cost of technology, demand formation, competitive advantages and access to information. The results demonstrate that the focus on environmentally friendly products occurs only if the costs of these innovations are low and demand is already formed. Awareness of the actions of competitors makes the market of environmentally friendly products more predictable, and more focused on the environmental friendliness of the product. The variety of environmentally friendly products is formed only under one condition – cost asymmetry. The formation of product differentiation is an important condition, since consumers in the market have different income levels. The article provides recommendations for the implementation of public policy aimed at supporting the reduction of companies’ costs for environmental innovations, and ensuring product differentiation that ensures the interests of all categories of consumers. Limitations of the study: the article does not study the demand function and its elasticity, and also does not study strategies related to the interaction of price and quantity of a productl.

 Рыночные стимулы внедрение экологически чистых продуктов асимметрия компаний Market incentives introduction of environmentally friendly products asymmetry.

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